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Gustav Ranis

ABSTRACT
Migration of the unskilled clearly benefits the origin country, mainly due to the flow of
remittances but also if the departure of some raises the ability of others to migrate. This depends
on whether trade is a complement or a substitute for migration. The impact of such flows on the
destination country is more ambiguous, although most research indicates that wages and
employment are not likely to be seriously affected.
Migration of the skilled is ambiguous with respect to the origin country since the impact
of brain drain on local development must be weighed against the signaling effect for additional
education plus the contribution of remittances. With respect to the destination country, the
inflow of skilled labor is generally considered an unambiguous plus as it contributes to the
enhancement of productivity.
The paper concludes with policy recommendations aimed at seizing the opportunities
arising from the fact that international migration remains the most constrained element of
globalization.
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I.

Introduction
The post-war era is, of course, not the first experience the world has had with

globalization in all its dimensions. The current episode can, however, be
distinguished from its 19th century predecessor by its scale, i.e. a world of 6 billion
inhabitants, massive movements of goods, services and capital – as well as by
continuously falling communication and transport costs, and, last but not least, the
instantaneous nature of information flows and agent reaction possibilities. When war
and inter-war autarky ended in 1945 international trade was first to pick up, followed
by a renewal of public capital movements (ODA) – first to Europe and subsequently
to the developing countries – subsequently followed by private portfolio capital and
foreign direct investment (FDI), quickly dwarfing ODA. The economic migration of
people – i.e. excluding refugees and asylum seekers, has lagged substantially behind
– largely because, despite calls – and considerable action – for the increased freedom
of trade, capital and associated technology mobility, barriers to the movement of
people remained high. It is this dimension of globalization which tends to cause the
strongest political resistance; when domestic workers are seen to be threatened by
some combination of technology change, imports and immigrants it is invariably the
latter which generates the largest rhetorical and policy response.
Nevertheless, pressures for enhanced migration are rising, certainly in the less
developed origin (O) countries, but also in some quarters of the more developed
destination (D) countries. And the very fact that migration has lagged substantially
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behind the other dimensions of globalization also provides the largest opportunity for
additional global welfare gains – especially today when further multilateral trade
liberalization is in considerable doubt. We will therefore focus on migration and its
interactions with the other elements of globalization as they impact development. In
this context, we will find it useful to distinguish between the costs and benefits
accruing to the countries of O and D, while differentiating between the movement of
skilled and unskilled migrants. Section II concentrates on the movement of unskilled
and its relation to the other dimensions of globalization, while Section III attempts the
same with respect to the skilled. Section IV suggests some conclusions for policy
within the same broad globalization framework.

II. Migration of the Unskilled
This type of migrant represents the largest potential benefit to global welfare even
as the distribution of the gains as between O and D countries remains controversial.
The desire to migrate by both the unemployed, underemployed and those employed at
very low incomes in the third world is a function of the availability of information,
geographic distance, the gaps in prospective life-time incomes, plus the perceived
probability of gaining employment in the D country. The ability to migrate, on the
other hand, depends on some combination of family income levels, access to credit
markets, government support, the extent of diaspora corridors abroad and, of course,
the level of entry barriers erected by the D countries. As indicated in Figure 1a
picturing Mexico as a typical case, we can expect the desire to migrate to dominate
both the private ability to do so and the D countries level of barriers. In some O
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countries, e.g. the Philippines, the government may step in by providing both
information and financial support, in return for the promise of enhanced remittances
which tend to shift up both the desire and ability curves. However, to the extent that
immigration barriers remain the dominant constraint, i.e. X marks the actual level of
migration, there will be increasing pressure to attempt illegal entry.

The benefits of unskilled migration to the O country are clear. Given the fact that
it is likely to find itself in a labor surplus condition, the withdrawal of even
substantial numbers of unskilled workers from rural or, more likely, urban informal
sector pursuits is not likely to affect output significantly; indeed, given that there is
likely to be family subsidization of underemployed relatives, plus a real chance for
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positive adjustments in technology made possible as a consequence of such
departures, productivity is likely to rise and poverty to decline.
There are other substantial benefits accruing to the O country. Chief of these is
the receipt of the remittances which not only substantially enhance family incomes
but also have important dynamic spill-over effects. Such receipts are likely to
encourage additional entrepreneurial and investment activities by those left behind
and, probably as important, innovative activities by returning migrants who have had
new windows and contacts opened to them while abroad, especially since the D
country is likely to be a more advanced market economy. But even in relatively
advanced developing O countries such as Pakistan, sending temporary migrants to the
Middle East, evidence from its North-West Frontier Province has indicated the
important entrepreneurial, human capital contribution of returned migrants, along
with their financial capital.
Mexico, for example, receives $20-25 billion in remittances annually, exceeding
FDI flows ($18 billion in 2004), and estimated to provide 20-30% of her microenterprise capital.1 In 2000 Mexico’s unskilled earnings gap with the U.S. was
roughly 6 times.2 An individual’s average annual gain by moving to the U.S. is thus
estimated at $10,000 which, over a working life, amounts to a roughly $250,000
differential, clearly undergirding the desire to migrate - substantially above either the
ability to migrate or the legal barrier put up by the U.S. The Philippine case is not too
different, except that here, as noted above, the government has been more directly
involved in supporting emigration via the provision of information and credit
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advances. Between 1975 and 1986 the number of Philippine contract workers
moving to other parts of Asia increased from 4,200 to 76,650 and those moving to the
Middle East from 1, 552 to 262,758.3 In 2003, remittances amounted to 10.2% of
GDP, up from 2.7% in 1990.4 Globally, remittances have reached $150 billion in
20045, almost 3 times ODA, with an estimated additional $50 billion underreported.
In some O countries remittance flows have risen to 40% of export earnings and 20%
of GDP. These flows have clearly helped reduce poverty rates and had an equalizing
effect on the distribution of income.
Remittances, as well as other types of capital inflows, including ODA and private
capital, of course, substitute for unskilled labor migration. To the extent such inflows
generate equitable growth, the income gaps between the O and D countries will
decline and the desire to migrate will fall even as the ability rises. If, after some time,
the country is successful in reaching East Asian NIC status, or Kuznets’ epoch of
“modern economic growth”, the D country’s import barriers will at some point, i.e.
beyond X, no longer be binding (see Figure 1b).
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Remittances have additional advantages in comparison with other types of capital
inflows. For one, they are likely to be more dependable, fluctuating less; for another,
they are likely to be counter-cyclical, i.e. increasing in times of economic decline or
natural disasters, while other types of private capital often act cyclically. Moreover,
remittances are less likely to cause Dutch Disease problems, either of the narrow or
the extended variety. With respect to the traditional, narrow variety, since
remittances are likely to be more broadly dispersed, frequently ending up in the hands
of rural and urban informal sector families, they are less likely to cause a
strengthening of the currency and a shift from exportable to non-traded goods,
especially if they are used for entrepreneurial investment rather than purely
consumption activities. Turning to the extended Dutch Disease variety, which we
define as the political economy consequence of capital inflows which tend to take the
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pressure off and thus permit governments to actually avoid reforms, the decentralized
character of remittances again renders them comparatively much less likely than
foreign aid to be a source of reform obstruction and the object of rent-seeking and
corruption.
The most important substitute for unskilled labor migration is, of course, trade
which is able to incorporate such labor in the form of labor intensive commodities
and send it to the D country “under the radar.” Unfortunately, while trade has
virtually exploded in the post-war era, early liberalization efforts have recently tended
to run out of steam and neo-protectionist measures, including anti-dumping
provisions and exemptions from preferences, targeted especially on textiles, shoes
and other labor intensive commodities, have been on the rise.
In addition to trade and capital movements, an additional substitute for unskilled
migration is the inflow of technology, especially if it is adaptable to the more labor
abundant environment of the O country and thus enhances the potential of keeping
unskilled labor productively employed at home or embodied in exports. Indeed, I
would place much more weight, either in discussing the impact of migration, of trade
or of capital, on such dynamic dimensions rather than on static comparative
advantage and efficiency criteria.
In summary, various other dimensions of globalization can act as substitutes for
unskilled labor migration. Moreover, the economic benefits of such migration for the
O country are overwhelmingly clear. On the negative side of the ledger, we can
record the not inconsiderable social costs incurred as a result of prolonged family
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separations as well as the risks of exploitation and ill treatment of migrants,
temporary or permanent, in the D country.
Turning to the benefits and costs of unskilled migration with respect to the D
country, the situation is somewhat less clear. The arrival of “cheap labor” from
abroad is usually greeted by much more political flak than the arrival of “cheap
goods” incorporating “cheap labor.” Yet both serve the interests of dispersed D
country consumers since the former may encourage the survival, at least for a time, of
relatively “sick” or defensive industries, while the latter directly enhances consumer
welfare. The other benefits, increasingly recognized, especially in the rich D countries
suffering from low birth rates, is that large-scale migration by overwhelmingly young
workers is necessary to help support the welfare and safety net packages of the
indigenous elderly population. We can safely assume that such pressures in the future
will be even greater because of continuously falling birth rates and rising life
expectancies. It is, moreover, a fact that there are jobs, at the lower end of the
occupational totem pole, mostly in agriculture and personal services, that D country
workers are reluctant to take up and which have been increasingly filled by unskilled
immigrants. In this important sense, unskilled immigrants are substitutes for capital,
increase indigenous labor force participation rates and thus enhance the productive
capacity of the D country.
Nevertheless, resistance to the admission of unskilled migrants continues to be
formidable in almost all D countries. The key objection, emanating mainly from
unions and their political allies, focuses on the cost, in terms of lowering indigenous
unskilled worker wages, as we would expect from economic theory. Nevertheless,
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what empirical evidence we have casts doubt on the robustness of this effect. David
Card, for example, examining such national experiments as the Mariel boat lift and
Algerian inflows into France, found only relatively minor negative wage impacts on
earlier migrants and virtually none on indigenous unskilled workers.6 All in all, from
a global welfare point of view, unskilled migration from poor to rich countries seems
to have large upside benefits for both sides, yet it is clearly the most controversial,
and the most restricted, of all globalization flows. Here politics and both intentional
and unintentional misperceptions decidedly trump economics.

III.

Migration of the Skilled
When we attempt to examine the costs and benefits for both the O and D

countries of high talent labor migration the story is , of course, quite different. The
benefit to the O country is still the contribution such migrants make to the volume of
remittances, although the spending pattern of these somewhat more well-to-do left
behind families is likely to be somewhat different, i.e. more additional consumption
rather than investment oriented. Still, on the benefit side, skilled migrants are likely
to stimulate others in the O country to seek additional education in preparation for
future migration, thus increasing the average level of education. Moreover, there is a
good chance that such migrants will ultimately return, once the home country has
reached a certain level of income and opportunity. This has certainly proven to hold
in the cases of Korea, Taiwan and India with engineers, IT specialists and others
leaving Silicon Valley and its equivalents, returning home– sometimes after many
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years – and contributing in a major way to the growth of high tech industries in the O
countries.
But there are also costs to be considered, especially in the short run, when a poor
O country loses valuable human capital on which it has invested substantial
educational expenditures. This perverse movement of human capital – from poor to
rich countries – has occasioned much discussion and policy debates in the past,
including Bhagwati’s suggestion of an exit tax and equally unimplemented efforts to
restrict long-term stays abroad by legal/contractual means.
While high talent manpower is clearly needed to support the O country’s
development efforts, all too frequently the educational structure yields outputs not
really suited to the needs of the contemporary economy, creating a mismatch, with
potentially explosive political consequences, e.g. the well-known case of the highly
skilled unemployed in Sri Lanka. In such circumstances, unless the domestic
educational production function can be reformed so that the output is better suited to
the developing country’s needs, emigration may provide the only possible escape
valve. On the other hand, there are cases, including the Philippines, where it is
official policy to generate skilled labor, in this instance doctors and nurses,
specifically for purposes of export and remittances, seen not as a cost but as a benefit
to society.
Turning to the D country situation, while unskilled immigrants, as we have seen,
can generally be viewed as substitutes for capital, skilled labor is likely to constitute a
complement to the rich country’s capital, both physical and human. While D country
immigration barriers are therefore usually friendlier to skilled immigrants than to the
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unskilled, empirical evidence indicates that the negative impact of such arrivals on
the incomes of their indigenous counterparts is actually likely to be larger than what
we found to be the case for the unskilled. Unless the skilled arrivals fill a particular,
relatively poorly serviced, non-competitive niche or, in a dynamic context, are in a
position to help generate entirely new economic activities, they ultimately represent a
greater threat to the income levels of their domestic counterparts than in the unskilled
case. Nevertheless, given their modest number and the relative absence of union
opposition to their arrival, the overall political resistance is likely to be much lower;
moreover, the recognition that they help overcome specific shortages and/or provide
entrepreneurial energy and generate precious technology change, especially in the
knowledge industries, is more likely to carry the day, certainly in the more dynamic D
countries. In the case of the U.S., for example, it has been estimated that a 10%
increase in the number of foreign graduate students raises patent applications by
4.7%, and we all know of the contribution of Chinese and Indian migrants to the
science and technology explosions in the Silicon Valley.

IV.

Conclusions for Policy
It should be abundantly clear that the enhanced South-North migration of both

unskilled and skilled individuals would not only increase global welfare but is almost
certain to benefit both the O and D countries. At present, since migration is clearly
the most constrained of the various dimensions of globalization, it also offers the
greatest potential for future gains. This potential emanates not only from the fact that
it is a static substitute or complement to the other elements of globalization but also
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because, as we have noted above, it also has a potentially important dynamic catalytic
impact.
International trade has initially exploded, rising 25 times since 1950, much faster
than per capita income. Even if the Doha Round cannot be resuscitated, we can
expect trade to continue to grow – if at somewhat lower rates - since it is generally
recognized to represent a positive sum game – even if the gains are not equitably
distributed as between North and South. The arrivals of foreign capital, shifting from
ODA in the immediate post-war era to private flows, can also be expected to continue
to expand – and the same can be said of the transfer of technology, even though traderelated property rights issues do still need to be sorted out.
The most obvious policy conclusion, but also the most difficult to implement,
would, of course, be for the D countries to lower their barriers to migration,
especially those curbing the unskilled labor variety. When domestic producers and
labor unions in the so-called sunset industries feel threatened by a combination of
technology change, competitive imports and the arrival of migrant workers, it is
usually the latter, more visible and threatening, which is likely to bear the brunt of
restrictive actions. While, as already mentioned, politics here is usually in a good
position to trump rationality, just as with respect to the traditional emphasis on
reciprocity in trade liberalization negotiations, nowhere else is the problem as
pronounced as in the realm of international migration. The resistance is usually more
modest with reference to the flow of skilled immigrants since they can be defended as
likely to be net helpful to the local economy. Even as the pressures mount to accept
more immigrants, whether for reasons of demographics, business interests,
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entrepreneurial renewal, or job characteristics, most rich D countries, e.g. Japan and
the U.S., prefer to close one eye to illegal immigration rather than to lower official
barriers. This holds generally in spite of the serious humanitarian and rule-of-law
related side-effects. The recently passed U.S. immigration legislation, focused on
penalties and border fences, can be seen as a response to this general attitude.
Multilateral negotiations to reduce migration barriers have never been tried.
Given the convergence of issues relating to trade and immigration, such a function
might sensibly be lodged in the WTO. With services now included in WTO
negotiations this would represent a rational extension - especially when migration is
increasingly perceived as of potential benefit to both rich and poor countries. Though
there are legitimate worries about the further overloading of that body, this would
appear to be a better option than working with the toothless International
Organization for Migration - or creating yet another new look-alike institution.
Secondly, as the 2005 report of the UN’s Global Commission on National
Immigration emphasized, member countries’ “best practice” related to guest worker
arrangements could be generalized. For example, it recommended multilateral
consideration of a South Korean program forcing temporary migrants to deposit a
proportion of their earnings in a special savings account which is forfeited if
“temporary” threatens to become “permanent.”
A third policy option would be the installation of a much more effective trade
adjustment assistance program in D countries so that, given the simultaneous arrival
of immigrants and imports, affected domestic workers could be retrained and actually
moved into “sunrise industries.” Discussion during the WTO Hong Kong Ministerial

13

Conference in December ’05 suggested focusing ODA more specifically on the
facilitation of trade. Such an initiative could include moving towards a Global Trade
and Migration Adjustment Assistance Program, administered by the World Bank or
the WTO, financed mainly by D countries’ ODA contributions and following
multilaterally negotiated rules of the game. Foreign aid spent at home in this fashion
is likely to yield a higher return to D country taxpayers. Inevitably, when all is said
and done, elements of globalization can lead to some job losses in the D countries.
The reaction has varied from minimal state intervention in the form of a rather
ineffective adjustment assistance program – plus a rather flexible labor market – in
the U.S., to substantial public purse support, combined with strict government
controls over the labor market, in France. Perhaps the best model may be found in
Denmark which combines a generous public safety net with a relatively flexible labor
market. But since all, especially emerging countries, will not have the same
budgetary capacity, assistance from outside may be warranted. But, even in the
absence of major changes in the international rules of the game, O countries can
provide systematic information, and even financial support, to potential migrants,
both temporary and permanent, as for example, in the case of the Philippines.
Improving credit access may serve to reduce the demand and simultaneously enhance
the ability of unskilled would-be migrants to move – thus reducing the potentially
explosive gap previously referred to.
One way to be helpful in this regard is by facilitating the flow of
remittances which, as we have mentioned, can make important financial as well as
entrepreneurial contributions to the O countries’ development, while incurring much
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smaller risks than other capital flows with respect to either the narrow or broad
definition of the “Dutch Disease.” Given their increased importance and the even
more rapidly increasing realization of their importance to both parties, special efforts
should be made to reduce current exorbitantly high remittance transfer fees in the D
countries.
But, ultimately, the only reliable way to reduce expected lifetime income gaps
between individuals in the O and D countries is to enhance participatory, i.e. labor
absorbing, development in the former. With Mexican immigrants benefiting to the
extent of approximately $250,000 by migrating to the U.S., while equality of
outcomes is certainly not required, a reduction of such huge expected income gaps,
for an individual Mexican and, as important, for her children, undoubtedly is. And
that, in turn, of course, requires successful development in the O country, mainly a
domestic affair, but one that can be assisted from the outside. How to do this
effectively extends beyond the scope of this paper.7
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